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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

EISs in connection with the proposed projects, the court found the
Corps' issuance of FONSIs unsupportable, leaving many relevant
environmental questions unanswered. The court also noted the
Corps' issuance of the permits disregarded the directions of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, who, while the permit
applications were pending, instructed the Corps not to issue any
further permits for floating-casino projects in the counties where the
proposed projects were sited before the completion of a Programmatic
EIS addressing casino development in the region.
The court examined the Corps' treatment of direct impacts, such
as dredging, impacts on water quality, wetlands, aquatic habitat, intake
of larvae and eggs, and aquifers, and the effects of scouring and
shoaling on the development area. Although the court found the
Corps' analysis of several of these direct impacts sufficient, in
discussing the projects' affects on aquatic life, intake of larvae and
eggs, and impacts on wetlands, the court found the Corps'
documentation conclusory and lacking in substantive analysis. The
court next reviewed the Corps' analysis of indirect impacts. The court
found the Corps' jurisdiction encompassed the "heart of the
development projects." Moreover, the Corps expected secondary
development to flow from these projects. The Corps' failure to analyze
the impacts of these future projects rendered its review of indirect
impacts on the development area insufficient. In examining the
Corps' consideration of cumulative impacts, the court found the
Corps' conclusory analysis dismissing the significance of such impacts
inadequate because over twenty casinos had been permitted previously
along the Mississippi coast and significant controversy already existed
over the cumulative impacts of such development.
Finally, FOE claimed the proposed projects necessitated the
preparation of EISs because the foreseeable resulting impacts were
"significant" by definition.
The court found the "context and
intensity" of the foreseeable impacts, including the ecologically critical
nature of the project areas and the highly controversial nature of the
impacts, qualified the impacts as "significant." The court concluded
the Corps must prepare EISs, including adequate analysis of all
foreseeable direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts noted in the
administrative record, before it may issue any permits for the casino
projects. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of FOE.
Lucinda Henriksen
Indus. Enclosure Corp. v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 97 C 6850, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11567 (N.D. IM.July 26, 2000) (holding, within the
meaning of an insurance policy exclusion, the term flood is
unambiguous, and water that flows into an area that is normally dry is
a flood even if it is caused artificially).
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Industrial Enclosure Corporation ("IEC") filed a claim for breach
of contract against Northern Insurance Company of New York
("Northern") for denying coverage when water severely damaged IEC's
plant. IEC also claimed that Northern's parent company, Maryland
Casualty Company ("Maryland"), committed consumer fraud when
one of its agents sold the insurance policy to Northern. IEC moved for
summary judgment on the issue of coverage and Maryland moved for
summary judgment on the consumer fraud claim. The court denied
both motions.
IEC claimed a back-up or overflow from the sewers and drains
damaged its plant, and therefore, the policy covered the losses. IEC's
insurance policy contained an exemption that it did not cover floods.
Northern claimed that flood or surface water caused the damage, and
therefore, the policy did not cover the losses. Northern offered the
testimony of an expert, Gerald Robinson, who stated the sewer and
drain back-up were not the sole cause of the damage. Robinson
contended South Tributary ("Tributary") overflowed its banks into the
JB building, located east of the Tributary. Robinson stated the wall of
the JB building collapsed, releasing a large volume of water, which
damaged the IEC plant. IEC argued Robinson's conclusions were
unsupported by facts. The court found Robinson's indirect method to
show the sewer and drain back-up could not have caused the damage
was an acceptable way to reach his conclusion. The court allowed
Robinson's testimony.
IEC also contended the damage was not the result of a flood and
the definition of flood in the policy was ambiguous. IEC claimed that
because the water was redirected, it did not constitute a flood within
the meaning of the policy. The court disagreed citing precedent that a
term is only ambiguous if it is subject to more than one interpretation.
The court concluded that even if the policy did not define the term,
the term was not ambiguous.
IEC further claimed the facts in the case proved the damage
resulted from water released from theJB building. Although the court
agreed that water was released from the JB building, the facts showed
that after the water flowed from the JB building it flowed back into the
Tributary and proceeded to flood the IEC property. The court
concluded the water overflowed from a natural water course, and
therefore, fit the policy's flood exemption.
IEC stated the water was diverted from its regular flow, through the
JB building, and this diversion caused the damage. IEC supported this
contention through various cases defining surface water exclusions.
The court refused this construction of the facts. The court ruled that
even if the damage followed from the JB building's collapsed wall, the
facts did not bar Northern's reliance on the policy exemption.
IEC also claimed Maryland violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud
Act. IEC contended Maryland sold them a policy that covered sewer
back-up but excluded this problem's most common cause. IEC further
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stated the policy had ambiguous, undefined terms. IEC also argued
Maryland failed to deliver the policy within a reasonable time.
The court concluded the Northern representative was aware of IEC
needs and did not tell IEC of the new provision for a surface water
exclusion in the policy. This conclusion, along with the determination
that Maryland delayed delivery of the policy to IEC in a reasonable
time, created the possibility that IEC was deceived. The court
therefore denied both parties' motions for summary judgment.
Lynne Stadjuhar
Sheegog v. Washington, No. 99 C 7283, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9863
(N.D. M11. July 10, 2000) (holding complaint stated a claim on which
relief could be based in section 1983 claim for endangering health by
virtue of unsafe drinking water at a correctional facility).
Oliver Sheegog ("Sheegog"), an inmate incarcerated in the
Stateville Correctional Center ("Stateville"), brought a pro se section
1983 action against several Stateville officials and the Illinois
Department of Corrections after exhausting his administrative
remedies. He alleged his Eighth Amendment rights were violated due
to the drinking water at the prison being contaminated with
unacceptable radium levels. In 1992, Stateville received notice that its
drinking water exceeded the maximum allowable levels of radium, and
of its obligation to post the notice. Test results from 1992 and 1993
showed "gross alpha" and radium levels exceeded the Illinois Pollution
Control Board's maximum allowable concentrations.
Sheegog had been a Stateville inmate since 1997. His complaint
did not refer to any testing results prior to 1993, and instead, asserted
the water was still contaminated at the time his complaint was filed.
Sheegog contended he was induced to drink the water without
knowledge of the potential health risks caused by doing so. The
Stateville officials filed a 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss.
The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty to provide humane
conditions for prisoners. These conditions include the right to food,
and by logical extension, water, that does not present an immediate
danger to the health and well-being of those who consume it. Liability
under the Eighth Amendment has an objective and a subjective
component.
Under the objective component, the hardship alleged must be
objectively, sufficiently serious. An inmate need not show a present
physical injury. Thus, Sheegog's complaint satisfied the objective
component because, even though he suffered no present injury, he
alleged a continuous threat to his health. The threat was Stateville's
drinking water continued to contain an excessive level of radium that
endangered his health.

